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Structurally Unbalanced:

Cyclical and Structural Deficits in Arizona
By Matthew Murray with Kristin Borns, Sue Clark-Johnson, Mark Muro, and Jennifer Vey

Though the Great Recession may be officially over, all is not well in Arizona.

In sum, the choices that need
to be made by Arizonans are
difficult and will require of
leaders substantial selfdiscipline. Success at this
work is imperative as the first
order of business for Arizona
as the state prepares to embark on its second century.

Three years after the collapse of a massive real estate “bubble,” the deepest economic downturn in memory exposed and exacerbated one of the nation’s most profound state fiscal crises, with disturbing implications for Arizona citizens and the
state’s long-term economic health.
This brief takes a careful look at the Grand Canyon State’s fiscal situation, examining
both Arizona’s serious cyclical budget shortfall—the one resulting from a temporary
collapse of revenue due to the recession—as well as the chronic, longer-term, and
massive structural imbalances that have developed largely due to policy choices
made in better times. This primer employs a unique methodology to estimate the
size of the state’s structural deficit and then explores the mix of forces, including the
large permanent tax reductions, that created them. It also highlights some of the
dramatic impacts these fiscal challenges are having on service-delivery as well as
on local governments. The brief suggests some of the steps state policymakers must
take to close their budget gaps over the short and longer term. First, it urges better policymaking, and prods leaders to broaden, balance, and diversify the state’s
revenue base while looking to assure a long-haul balance of taxing and spending.
And second, it recommends that Arizona improve the information-sharing and budgeting processes through which fiscal problems are understood—so they may ultimately be averted.

I. Introduction
Technically, the Great Recession has ended. Economic output is growing and modest signs
of labor and housing market stabilization are evident. Yet many Arizona citizens would be
hard-pressed to express a belief of brighter days and more economic opportunity ahead.
Three years after the collapse of a massive real estate “bubble,” the deepest economic
downturn in memory has exposed a statewide moment of reckoning—Arizona’s fiscal
crisis looms large, with little to no sign of abating.
Complicating the moment is the fact that the state’s dire budget crisis is really two-fold,
because at present Arizona suffers not only from a massive cyclical deficit but also a
gargantuan structural deficit.
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Cyclical deficits can spike in economic downturns when reduced economic activity
diminishes revenue performance while lower incomes and higher unemployment rates
put added pressures on spending. At the same time, though, a weak economy can
also help expose longer-term structural (or chronic) imbalances between revenues and
expenditures. In this circumstance revenues consistently fail to grow in tandem with
expenditure obligations and the cost of government, often because past policy actions
have thrown off the balance of incoming revenue and ongoing spending.
In this fashion, Arizona is now struggling with two related but distinct fiscal disasters.
Recognized is the portion of the state’s budget crisis that has resulted from the sudden
collapse of annual revenues after the real estate crash and economic downturn. This crisis
has hit hard but will ease as the economy recovers.
Less understood is the depth of the state’s massive structural imbalance, which has arisen
thanks in large part to policy choices made during the go-go years of the state’s recent
past but which will not soon relent. During the growth years, legislative and executive
leaders acted as if the state could maintain a basic level of service provision even as it
implemented tax cuts that permanently reduced the state’s revenue base.
Now, the illusion has been shattered and the state’s yearly labors to close its fiscal year
budget gaps are about to get harder. With one-time fixes, gimmicks, and fund sweeps
exhausted, budget cuts from this point forward could—if handled crudely—prove
devastating and difficult to recover from. Serious discussions among state leaders have
included opting out of Medicaid, cutting a K-12 system often cited before the recession for
receiving the lowest per-pupil funding in the nation, and significantly reducing funding for
the state’s university system. At the same time, if managed well (that is, with a balanced
approach and a sense of strategy and rigor) the crisis might actually prompt innovation
instead of just pain.
But what is certain, at any rate, is that the current fiscal crisis will continue to have lasting
and damaging ramifications unless the state takes prompt, sober steps to address it. To
this end, this short introduction to the state’s cyclical and structural deficit problems
provides two groups of suggestions to the state as it prepares to attack its problems.
First, the state needs to improve the quality of its fiscal policymaking by moving to
broaden, balance, and diversify its revenue bases while looking to the long-haul balance
of taxing and spending. Implicit in this push must be a recognition that action has to
occur on both the revenue and reduction side of the equation. Spending cuts alone are
not going to put Arizona on a stable fiscal path.
And second, the state needs to improve the information sharing and budgeting processes
through which fiscal problems are identified, analyzed, and addressed. As part of this, the
state needs to put in place the sort of strategic plan that furnishes a long-term vision of
state success against which budgetary and other sorts of performance can be measured
against clear goals and mileposts.
In sum, the choices that need to be made by Arizonans are difficult and will require of
leaders substantial self-discipline. Success at this work is imperative as the first order of
business for Arizona as the state prepares to embark on its second century.

II. Framing the Issue: The Nature of State Structural Deficits
How can sizable structural deficits or even unmanageably large cyclical deficits exist
when states generally are required to maintain budget balance?
There are two basic ways. Cyclical deficits can spike in economic downturns when reduced
economic activity diminishes revenue performance and lower incomes and higher
unemployment rates put added pressures on spending. At the same time, a weak economy

2

Brookings Mountain West / Morrison Institute | January 2011

can also help expose longer-term structural (or chronic) imbalances between revenues and
expenditures. Such imbalances arise when revenue consistently fails to grow in tandem
with expenditure obligations and the cost of government, or when policy actions throw
incoming revenues and ongoing spending out of balance. At any point in time a state’s total
deficit (surplus) is the sum of its cyclical and structural deficits (surpluses).
What are the factors that influence the emergence of such imbalances? A permanent
imbalance between revenues and expenditures may arise from any number of sources
that broadly can be placed in three categories: the prevailing fiscal structure, economic
and demographic trends, and political decisionmaking. These three factors interact to
influence both near-term and long-term fiscal health. Consider each in turn:
▪ Fiscal structure. A state’s existing fiscal structure defines expenditure obligations and
the means of financing them through the tax system, and will influence the degree of
growth in revenues and expenditures over time. This fiscal structure will have its roots
in both statute and a state’s constitution. Some expenditures may be discretionary
while others may be mandated by previous choices made by voters and politicians.
For example, state constitutions typically require a level of elementary and secondary
education spending that is enshrined in the state’s legislated schools funding formula.
The revenue system structure used to pay for these and other expenditures includes
a mix of taxes (e.g. income, sales, property) and fees and their rates and bases, which
also vary from state to state. Overall fiscal performance is therefore heavily influenced
by a state’s overall revenue and expenditure arrangements, which affect the amount of
money coming in and going out of state coffers.
▪ The economy and demographics. Trends affecting a state’s economy and demographic
composition can impact how a given fiscal structure stands up across budget cycles. All
states with a sales tax, for example, have seen revenue performance weaken as the overall
economy has become more service-oriented, since the traditional sales tax falls primarily
on tangible goods. Population shifts, too, can impact a state’s fiscal health. The effects
of strong population growth, for example, depend on the extent to which new residents
pay for themselves: A large increase of lower-income residents places more pressure on
both sides of the budget than does a swelling middle- or upper-income populace. An
aging population, moreover, can contribute its own pressures by driving up spending on
health and human services. As such, a state largely without cyclical or structural deficits
today may see them emerge in the future as economic and demographic trends ripple
through the budget, even with no changes in policy.
▪ Political decisionmaking. Political decisions can play a huge role in budget dynamics,
as changes made to a state’s fiscal structure in one budget cycle can and often do have
significant effects on its long-term fiscal health. During periods of strong economic
growth, for example, states often enjoy cyclical budget surpluses. Decisionmakers
often fail, however, to consider that these surges in revenue are temporary. For that
reason, state budget surpluses are rarely saved in their entirety, with only a fraction
typically committed to rainy day funds. More often, the bulk of such surpluses is given
back to taxpayers through permanent tax cuts or used to support permanent spending
increases. As a result, a fiscal shortfall typically emerges during a downturn that includes
both the cyclical deficit along with any structural deficit arising from the long-term tax/
expenditure mismatch created during previous periods of economic expansion. In this
way, policy decisions made by state legislatures or directly by the voting public, as well
as by federal mandate, can contribute substantially to the emergence of permanent,
recurrent budget imbalances. For example, voter initiatives may be introduced that
mandate higher spending or that place restrictions on the effective capacity of states to
raise revenues—initiatives that, as noted above, can become fiscally unsustainable as
the economy progresses through the classic boom-and-bust cycle.
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In any event, these three forces each have an independent influence on the budget
and also can interact in such a way as to produce or magnify a fiscal crisis. A classic
convergence of crisis-spawning events is a growth cycle that produces rising income
tax revenues that in turn lead to tax cuts; healthy revenues that convince the public
to mandate spending increases; and a growing population that needs to be served by
program expansion. The convergence then brings disaster when the economy falls into a
recession, exposing the well-intentioned but ultimately faulty decisionmaking that took
place during times of better economic and fiscal health.
Though often overlooked, the imbalances created by structural deficits are hugely
important because they further complicate resolution of cyclical fiscal problems. Together,
the two sorts of deficits can produce devastating consequences for state economies
and their residents: Critical services ranging from public safety to education may be
subjected to larger cuts. Infrastructure spending may suffer from greater reductions and
deferral. And tax rates may need to be raised further than would be the case if the
state were only addressing a cyclical shortfall. Meanwhile, fiscal pressures on a state
ripple through to counties, cities, and school districts via reduced aid, diminished tax
sharing, and increased spending requirements that create additional hardship. These
policy outcomes can have lasting economic effects, and lead to future budget dilemmas
necessitating additional spending cuts or tax increases. Most notably, the local
government layoffs and service cutbacks that frequently result from state deficit traumas
and pass-throughs can depress spending, purchasing, and local contracting and place a
serious drag on regional economic performance.1 Which is to say, state-level grappling
with cyclical and structural deficits—and its impacts on localities—can become at a time
of economic shakiness the equivalent of a massive “anti-stimulus,” as The Washington
Post blogger Ezra Klein has put it.2

III. Estimating State Budget Deficits
This analysis of Arizona’s state budget deficits extends from FY 2007 through the current
fiscal year. The estimates of cyclical and structural deficits presented are built on a
unique methodology, a detailed description of which can be found in the appendix to
the companion document, Structurally Unbalanced: Cyclical and Structural Deficits in
California and the Intermountain West.3 But three caveats regarding the estimates are
worth emphasizing here:
First, the analysis does not account for capital expenditures and revenues/expenditures
that are not fully accounted for in the annual general fund budget (e.g. pension funds);
these other components of the state budget may also have imbalances that will not be
captured here.
Second, the measure of expenditure requirements is based on FY 2008, which may or
may not reflect the long-term spending needs of the state. In this respect, the analysis
assumes stable economic and demographic patterns. That is, there is no accounting for
potentially higher (lower) service delivery costs in future years, either due to differences
in input costs or the scope of the population benefiting from service delivery. In practice,
there are demographic and economic pressures building in Arizona that have the
potential to aggravate structural deficits in future years.
Third, the estimates are sensitive to the fiscal structure and the nature of the state’s
political decisionmaking. The expenditure policy changes that have transpired since
the FY 2008 baseline are assumed to be temporary, since past experience indicates that
recent cuts such as these are mostly restored when revenues rebound. If post-2008
spending cuts prove to be permanent then the structural deficit estimates reported here
would be diminished. However, future tax cuts or expenditure increases would add to
the structural deficit problem confronting the state.
In any event, the analysis is believed to represent a sound and revealing picture of the
state’s situation.
4
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IV. Cyclical and Structural Budget Deficits in Arizona
So, how serious are the state budget deficits facing Arizona?
In two words: exceptionally serious. According to this present analysis of cyclical and
structural deficits in the state, at least three disconcerting trends point to the depth and
nature of its fiscal crisis:

Arizona had by far the
largest estimated percentage
structural deficit among its
peers in the region in FY
2011, standing at over $2.1
billion, or a mammoth 21
percent of stable expenditures.

Arizona is under heavy fiscal stress. This analysis underscores that Arizona is grappling
with an extraordinary general fund deficit that was revealed and exacerbated by the
recent Great Recession. The state’s shortfalls include both a substantial cyclical deficit,
as well as a large structural deficit.
In FY 2011, Arizona had a cyclical deficit of 12 percent of 2008 baseline expenditures. To
put this in perspective, this is on par with California’s cyclical deficit, less than in Nevada,
and 3 percentage points larger than Colorado’s.
Meanwhile, however, the state had by far the largest estimated percentage structural
deficit among its peers in the region in FY 2011, standing at over $2.1 billion, or a
mammoth 21 percent of stable expenditures. This figure is also far higher than the
$825 million currently reported by the state’s joint legislative budget committee as the
revenue shortfall for FY 2011 as of November 2010.4 This $2.1 billion figure roughly
equals total state spending on the university/board of regents system along with all state
spending on protection and safety.
Both the cyclical and structural deficit estimates for FYs 2007 through 2011 are presented
in Table 1, while Figure 1 shows ongoing revenues and expenditures per $1,000 of
personal income in the state over time.
Table 1. Arizona faces massive cyclical and structural deficits
Surplus or Deficit in Millions

Surplus or Deficit as a Percentage of
Stable Expenditures

Fiscal Year

Total

Cyclical

Structural

Total

Cyclical

2007

$ -83

$ 1,669

$ -1,752

-1%

17%

Structural
-18%

2008

-1,381

664

-2,045

-14

7

-20

2009

-3,126

-1,057

-2,070

-31

-11

-21

2010

-3,764

-1,663

-2,101

-38

-17

-21

2011

-3,374

-1,240

-2,134

-33

-12

-21

Source: Brookings Mountain West / Morrison Institute / ASU

The state experienced a large swing in its cyclical fiscal situation over the past five
years while its structural deficit climbed. In the run up to the recession, Arizona boasted
large cyclical surpluses, having benefited from several years of strong economic growth.
In fact, at 17 percent of baseline expenditures, the state’s FY 2007 cyclical surplus far
exceeded that of other states in the region. The state still had a 7 percent cyclical surplus
in FY 2008.
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Figure 1. State revenues and expenditures in Arizona have often However, as occurred in other states, Arizona’s fiscal situation took a
diverged, creating budget deficits and surpluses.
nosedive the following year, as the economy tanked and revenue yields
fell. In FY 2009, the state’s previous-year surplus morphed into a deficit of
11 percent as a share of stable expenditures, before climbing to 17 percent
in FY 2010, and then falling to 12 percent in 2011. This dramatic reversal
of fortunes owes to the way the state’s particular revenue system interacts
with the state’s extremely cyclical economy. The state’s significant swings
in revenue over the last two decades, even after adjusting for tax law
changes, can be seen in the line chart at left.

a. For the above chart, the difference between the two lines represents the total deficit or
surplus: Where the expenditure line is higher, the difference is the total deficit; where the
revenue line is higher, the difference is the total surplus. However, the deficit indicated
by a comparison of the two lines is definitionally different than the deficits estimated for
this paper.
b. One-time or temporary budget fixes are not included in the revenue figures.
c. Expressing the revenues and expenditures per $1,000 of personal income automatically
adjusts for inflation, population growth, and real per capita economic growth.

Arizona’s structural deficit, meanwhile, was large throughout the
period, growing from 18 percent of stable expenditures in FY 2007
to 21 percent in FYs 2009 through 2011. This increase was attributed
to continued tax cuts, particularly a large income tax reduction that
became effective in 2008.

Arizona’s structural deficit predates the current recession and is
largely the result of policy-induced revenue reductions. That Arizona is
experiencing a large cyclical deficit is not surprising. So are most states.
Though the magnitude of state deficits varies from state to state, the
source is largely the same: dramatic drops in revenue due to the recent
recession and protracted economic downturn. As the economy slowly
recovers, the cyclical deficit will decline and eventually become a cyclical surplus—but any
underlying structural deficits will remain, poised to exacerbate the next economic slump.
Structural deficits arise from a more complex set of factors, the relative influence of
which varies across states and remains permanent.
Representing longer-term imbalances between revenues and expenditures, structural
deficits develop in part from the complex interaction between a state’s fiscal and
institutional structures and economic and demographic change.
But states’ fiscal challenges are often compounded by discretionary policy changes and
voter initiatives that permanently diminish revenue productivity or increase spending
on services. This is clearly the case in Arizona, where its structural deficit is largely,
though not exclusively, rooted in policy actions that began eroding the state’s available
revenues long before this most recent economic downturn took hold. Beginning in FY
1993, the state implemented tax cuts in every year through FY 2002, and again from FYs
2005 through 2010 (though in only about half of these years was the revenue reduction
substantial). Nominally, the net changes during this 17-year period totaled some $1.7
billion. Adjusting for inflation, population growth, and real per capita economic growth,
the cumulative impact climbs to $2.9 billion. All kinds of taxes were cut, but 58 percent
of the total in nominal dollars came from the personal income tax.5
On the other side of the budget ledger, two major impacts on general fund expenditures
have occurred since the structural deficit began in the early 1990s. First, funding for
school construction was shifted into the general fund in FY 1999, with no additional
revenue being provided. The annual expense has been as high as $500 million. Second,
in 2000 voters passed two competing ballot initiatives to expand Medicaid by using
tobacco settlement monies. However, the specified funding source was inadequate to
support the expansions, so additional funding had to be drawn from the general fund.
As Figure 1 shows, though, overall general fund expenditures in the state have actually
decreased over time.
Meanwhile, Arizona confronts several constraints on fiscal flexibility that are already
complicating its ability to eliminate its massive structural deficit. There are two key
restrictions that impact Arizona’s budget process. Most notably, the state’s requirement
for a supermajority for any revenue increase will greatly hinder revenue-side responses.

6
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The most recent example is the temporary one-cent sales tax increase passed by voters
in May 2010. The issue had to go to voters, after much debate, because the legislature
indicated it could not come close to the number of votes required to pass the revenue
measure. As a result, it took more than a year’s time from the initial discussion of the
revenue increase to passage, time that the state could have been collecting that revenue.
While there are those who argue that such a provision may protect the budget process
from capricious increases in spending, it greatly complicates prudent fiscal management.
Additionally, Arizona’s “voter protection” of programs passed at the ballot box locks in
programs unless the issue comes before voters again. As a result, these funds cannot be
part of a larger budget solution. By locking these funds away in perpetuity, it makes it
difficult to devise prudent responses when the economic climate changes or program
needs change.

Arizona’s deep fiscal
imbalances owe mostly to
self-inflicted damage to the
state’s revenue system and
related policy changes.

In sum, Arizona’s deep fiscal imbalances owe mostly to self-inflicted damage to the
state’s revenue system and related policy changes.

V. State Impacts, Recent Responses, and Continuing Implications
Cyclical and structural budget imbalances of the scale roiling Arizona have already had,
and will continue to have, disturbing practical consequences.
Most notably, dramatic decreases in spending have already caused significant reductions
in service provision across critical program areas. The cuts have been sharp and painful.
For example:

•

From FY 2008 to 2010 the state sliced K-12 funding by 20 percent, and university
budgets by 28 percent.6 Some of this reduction has been temporarily masked by
additional federal stimulus dollars. Those, however, are coming to an end. Likewise,
the state eliminated full-day kindergarten earlier this year to free up $218.3 million.7

•

The state reduced the lifetime eligibility for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) benefits to just 36 months from 60 months—a move that revoked support
for 8,200 families. 8

•

And the state recently stopped financing certain organ transplants under Arizona’s
Health Care Cost Containment System, the state’s version of Medicaid.9

What is more, Arizona’s state budget crisis is also exacerbating local budget distress,
as the state has increasingly reduced aid to local governments in order to make up for
reduced tax revenue collections.10 (See the nearby text box.)
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Impacts: State Aid Cuts Hit Rural and Urban Counties Alike
Arizona’s current 12 percent cyclical deficit and whopping 21 percent structural shortfall are forcing headline-grabbing state
government cuts to education and services. Less covered but nearly as disruptive are the grinding, now intensifying impacts of
the crisis on the state’s rural and urban counties.
Arizona’s 15 counties—which manage such critical matters as public safety, health, economic development, and land management—have been working since 2007 to adjust their budgets in response to the economic downturn by laying off personnel,
reducing service levels, tapping financial reserves, eliminating non-mandated programs, and decreasing capital projects and
road building. But even as county leaders have struggled to get their own fiscal houses in order, the reality of shared state revenue and program responsibility and the need to balance the state budget has piled on an additional load of fiscal burdens. Put
simply, the state’s budget problems are now dragging these local governments into crisis, with troubling implications for both
rural and urban Arizonans.
All told, from FY 2008 to FY 2011, Arizona counties suffered a collective loss of $193.6 million due to the state’s budget woes.
Statewide program shifts, where the state pushes the cost of a particular mandated program further downstream onto localities, have cost counties $44.6 million over these past four budgets. And county receipts of Highway User Revenue Fund monies
have fallen by $40.4 million. County transfers (i.e. the statutorily required transfer of tax dollars from the county to the state
general fund) and lost revenue streams from, for example, the elimination of counties’ share of lottery revenues, account for the
remaining $108.6 million.
The fiscal impacts of these state-induced revenue drops vary across the state’s counties, particularly between its rural and urban
jurisdictions. Rural counties, for their part, are hamstrung by a very limited tax base, a result of both their small populations
and state legislation passed in the early 2000s that requires hard-to-gain voter approval for any tax hikes. This lack of flexibility leaves these counties’ hands tied and unable to react nimbly to volatility in the economy, and the whims of the state. The
nearly 40,000 residents of Graham County, for example, have experienced first hand the combined impacts of the state’s fiscal
laxity—which has translated into a $1.01 million loss for the county in FY 2011 alone—and the county’s own downturn-related
budgetary shortfalls.22 Plans to improve and expand the county jail have been halted, for instance, forcing Graham to use its
already scarce resources to transport female prisoners to a neighboring county. Similarly, it has had to table a Gila River bridge
reconstruction project such that five dozen of its citizens must travel an extra 20 miles to access schools and the nearest community. With reserves gone and no ability to raise taxes, any additional state impacts will necessitate dramatic reductions in
full-time county staff, the numbers of which have already been cut by 10 percent.
Meanwhile, Arizona’s urban counties have had their own fiscal struggles. The capital county of Maricopa displays what is happening. The County Supervisors Association of Arizona reports that the state has burdened Maricopa County alone with $116
million in extra expenses since FY 2008, ranging from one-way transfers (to the tune of $77.3 million), to reductions in shared
revenues, to the shifting of responsibilities for certain programs like juvenile corrections. Maricopa has acted swiftly to keep
its budget in balance going into the downturn—but its largely successful efforts have come at a hefty price. The number of
county staff has been cut by 10 percent since 2007 to approximately 12,500, and it has been forced to make drastic reductions
in non-mandated and non-voter-protected services, especially human services. Meals-on-Wheels and the Special Needs Transportation program—which provided home-delivered meals and rides for the elderly and disabled—have both been suspended
indefinitely, demonstrating in very real terms how the state’s balance sheet problems fall upon its most vulnerable residents.
All of this is hitting counties just as their own revenues, which lag cyclical developments in the economy by about two years,
reach their low points. Developing a county budget for FY 2011-12 will be the most challenging yet. In addition to the ongoing
legislative impacts enacted to date, local revenues continue to be anemic, and mandated payments to the Arizona long-term
care system are expected to shoot up about $80 million as enhanced federal assistance to the state expires. Making matters
worse, eight counties have experienced substantial reductions in their local property tax base (as much as 11 percent) due to
home devaluation, creating significant political pressure to reduce property taxes.
As county leaders continue to try to balance dwindling resources with needed local service delivery, they face the unsettling fact
that the fate of their operations may largely be determined by how state lawmakers choose to deal with Arizona’s fiscal deficit—
and the extent to which they will continue to off-load major expenses to the county taxpayer. Their fear is informed by history. In
recent years, legislative proposals put on the table included increasing the counties’ share of state health care costs, and transferring state juvenile corrections responsibilities and thousands of adult prisoners to county facilities. Though rejected at the time,
state leaders just may well entertain similar concepts again. For Arizona counties, then, the worst may be yet to come.

8
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The state has relied
disproportionately on
temporary or one-time
measures to fill its fiscal
holes, rather than permanent
repairs to the tax and
expenditure system—despite
the fact that many of the
problems are long run in
nature.

And yet, for all the painful moves Arizona has undertaken in the last two years to close its
recent budget gaps, little has been done to address the longer-term structural pressures
on revenues and expenditures. Instead, the state has relied disproportionately on
temporary or one-time measures to fill its fiscal holes, rather than permanent repairs to
the tax and expenditure system—despite the fact that many of the problems are long run
in nature. For example, the temporary one-cent sales tax rate increase was implemented
in 2010 with great controversy to help close a budget gap that was well over $1 billion.
The state also garnered national attention for its asset sales, which included the state
Capitol and Supreme Court building. Of the $12.5 billion in total budget adjustments
since 2008, 80 percent of the balancing act has been realized by one-time measures.11
Yet now that the “easier” options have been exhausted, starker choices are coming, both
today as well as during the next economic downturn.
Speculation now abounds that the K-12 and university systems will bear the brunt of
substantial new cuts—a potential disaster as Arizona tries to position itself to diversify its
economic base and develop the sort of high-impact, good-paying industries that require
a top-quality “job-ready workforce.”
What is more, Arizona’s budget situation—like that in other states—is likely to get
worse before it gets better. In fact, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
projects a continued deterioration in the state’s budget outlook for decades to come
absent fundamental policy changes that address core imbalances between revenues
and spending.12
There are several interrelated reasons for this. First, it will take years for levels of
economic activity and revenue yield to return to their pre-recession peaks. While some
recent projections are a bit more optimistic, job growth will likely remain anemic and
unemployment rates stubbornly high for a number of years. At the same time, with
consumption down and purchases of untaxed services (as a share of all purchases) up,
sales tax growth is likely to be muted. Overall, it is likely that the revenue side of the
state’s budget will not fully rebound until at least 2013 or 2014.
Second, however dire the state’s fiscal situation may become, with the withdrawal of federal
fiscal stimulus funds in 2011—estimated to have provided $2.4 billion to the state in both
stimulus and enhanced match for Medicaid since 2008—and little chance of further relief
in store, the state will almost certainly be on its own to deal with its obligations and existing
mandates.13 The increased federal matching rate for Medicaid spending will also end in
2011, for example, and absent the full restoration of state revenues, more service cuts can
be expected. All told, Arizona is looking at the loss of $800 million in federal Medicaid funds
in 2011. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that eliminated services have
already impacted approximately 1 million enrollees.14
And then there is the potential for new federal mandates—a third unwelcome possible
development. A case in point is the higher health care costs associated with national
health insurance reform. While reform will achieve the goal of bringing large numbers
of the uninsured into the service net, it offers no effective means of fostering health care
cost containment. Moreover, a significant financing burden will be shifted to the states
after the initial period of transition.
In sum, while cyclical surpluses will return to Arizona—eventually and temporarily—the
stark fact remains that the state and its peers face a very bleak fiscal prognosis. Even
when revenues do eventually recover to pre-recession peaks, the state will face a pentup demand for the full range of long-reduced public services, at the same time that it
must address the crucial need to replenish its emptied rainy day fund.15 Aggravating these
burdens will be demographic trends, including more children to serve in the public schools,
and a growing, aging population in need of increasingly expensive health care services.
Finally, mounting pressures outside of the state general fund, particularly from pensions,
will reduce the funds available to support other areas of the budget.16 All the while, rising
anti-tax sentiment will make it exceedingly difficult to raise taxes or broaden tax bases to
pay for growing encumbrances, however essential or unavoidable they may be.
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VI. Narrowing the Gap: Reducing Cyclical and Structural
Budget Deficits and Improving Arizona’s Fiscal Stability
The cyclical and structural deficits confronting Arizona are enormous. Arizona must look
within and make wise and strategic policy choices to address these fiscal imbalances,
including not just strategic program cuts, but also the tax reforms essential to improving
revenue streams over both the immediate term and for the long haul.
And so the state needs to break with its past budgeting habits and move urgently to
inaugurate more prudent, strategic, and better-informed tax, spending, and budget
planning practices. To this end, a broad principle should be embraced that would insist
that permanent policy changes on one side of the budget must be matched by permanent
policy changes on the other side of the budget.
More specifically, there are two sorts of steps that need to be taken to begin reducing the
state’s present structural gaps and prevent their return. Within these two areas, a few
recommendations are here offered, not as a complete response to the state’s massive
problems, but as discussion-starters:
First, Arizona leaders need to improve the quality of fiscal policymaking by steadily
working to broaden, balance, and diversify their revenue bases while looking to the
long-haul fit of taxing and spending. Questionable past policy decisions have played a
large role in the emergence of significant structural deficits in Western states. It follows,
therefore, that improved policymaking represents the key to improved fiscal stability
going forward. To that end, lawmakers in Arizona should embrace a number of widely
recognized tenets of good management that ensure appropriate responses to a fluid
economic and fiscal environment, including the ability to meet changing and newly
emerging budgetary needs. These tenets should motivate a number of concrete actions:
Commit to a balanced approach. Lawmakers should embrace balance as a watchword
as they seek to stabilize year-to-year finances and narrow structural gaps. One sort
of balance should be a balance of revenue- and spending-side responses. The state’s
massive budget gaps simply cannot be responsibly closed with only spending reductions.
A second sort of balance is that which arises from diversification of the tax system. The
proliferation of tax reductions implemented in the state since the early 1990s have made
the revenue system not only narrower, but also more vulnerable to cyclical variations in
the economy. State leaders need to commit to a more balanced approach and to making
the hard choices on both the spending and revenues sides of the budget to achieve it.

When the tax system was
originally established in
Arizona, leaders could not
foresee the growth, and in
some ways dominance, of
the service economy. The
tax system in place today
does not capture the true
economic activity in the
marketplace.

Broaden tax bases and improve their responsiveness. Tax policies that increase the
base and elasticity of state tax systems would help mitigate structural deficits and reduce
the need for discretionary rate increases. For example, expanding the sales tax base
to include more consumer services would both account for the growing importance of
services in the economy and increase the tax’s revenue yield. When the tax system was
originally established in Arizona, leaders could not foresee the growth, and in some ways
dominance, of the service economy. The tax system in place today does not capture
the true economic activity in the marketplace. Now, of course, it is true that elastic tax
systems are a two-edged sword, producing strong revenue gains when the economy
grows but also contracting sharply during recessions. Going forward, therefore, the new
revenues could be used to enhance rainy day fund balances to bring greater stability to
the overall system.
Increase local flexibility and control. State legislators and voters (via statewide ballot
initiatives) have a history of passing measures that constrain local governments’ ability to
raise revenues and respond to changing fiscal circumstances. For example, capping the
property taxes that localities are permitted to levy—a measure imposed by Arizona’s state
legislature on localities—severely constrains local fiscal flexibility. Local governments exist
in an asymmetric relationship with states as well: They are dependent on states for large
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portions of their budgets and can be forced via state mandates to pick up unexpected tabs,
as they have been in Arizona. (See sidebar.) In a 2008 National League of Cities report,
Christopher Hoene and Michael Pagano offer a series of recommendations that can
accommodate greater local control over revenue generation and public service provision,
including access to a variety of general tax instruments (sales, property, and income),
increased state aid, and fewer tax and spending limitations.17 Such adjustments will also
build balance into the combined state-local system and allow flexibility when it is needed.
Additionally, providing more flexibility to the state legislature through modification of
“voter-protected programs” appears another way to create a more responsive system.
Currently, many of these programs exist, in perpetuity, without review or consideration of
new and emerging fiscal needs. Options to still respect the will of the voters, but provide
more room for adaption to changing circumstances, include requiring voter-approved
programs to have a sunset provision, and/or requiring voters to actively reevaluate and
reauthorize a program after a set time period in order for it to continue.
Second, state leaders need to improve policymaking by institutionalizing better budget
processes and information sharing. There are no easy answers to complicated budget
puzzles. And for that reason, sound processes and quality information about real and
projected conditions and the range of policy options and their consequences are critical
to improved policymaking. In order to reach a sustainable fiscal trajectory, then, Arizona
should move to:
Report budgets in a transparent manner. Arizona should commit to reporting
critical budget data in a user-friendly format along with interpretative narrative on
state government web pages. Transparency is essential to accountability and sound
decisionmaking. Therefore, copious data should be easily available online. Budget
guides for the public and legislators should explain in clear language historical budget
patterns, current budget policy issues, and the long-term pressures on public finances.18
Such information will help lawmakers and the public understand the implications of their
decisions for the state’s budget future.19
Additionally, budget packages should be available for public review, and the process
should allow appropriate time for public comment. Many budgets, while discussed
publicly in the abstract, come together in the 11th hour, and are passed quickly and with
little public input.
Move to multi-year budgeting. Fiscal year budgets and two- and four-year election
cycles can easily be in conflict with one another. The state’s approach to capital budgeting,
moreover, offers little clarity on investments, their return, and the consequences for
long-term financial obligations; sinking funds and schedules of debt liability repayment
exist, but these do not fully rationalize capital spending in the eyes of the public. As the
National Association of State Budget Officers notes, the capital budgeting plan is just
one year in Arizona compared to nine years in Nevada.20 Short time frames for capital
budgeting simply do not make good sense from a planning and long-term financial
perspective. Another example is Arizona’s expanded Medicaid coverage, passed in
2000. This relied on tobacco settlement funds. At the time, this funding source appeared
to provide the fiscal support the program required, though as years have passed and
that funding has fallen, the cost to the general fund continues to grow. This program in
particular could have benefited from review and planning through the lens of multi-year
budgeting. Transparency using fully integrated capital and multi-year budgets would
help demonstrate the long-term consequences of prevailing fiscal policy as well as
changes to the tax/expenditure mix.
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Arizona does not have a
strategic plan, articulating
a vision with measurable
mileposts.

Craft a statewide strategic plan, driven by measurable goals. Arizona does not have
a strategic plan, articulating a vision with measurable mileposts. When a state has
definable goals within a plan framework it improves the ability of policymakers to make
difficult decisions by keeping the state’s long-term goals in mind, protecting them in an
effort to keep the state moving forward on a positive trajectory even in the worst of
times, and positioning the state more strongly for eventual economic recoveries.
A key consideration in crafting a strategic plan is to include as a fundamental premise
the need to take actions that will encourage and sustain economic development.
Solutions could include re-examination of the corporate tax as well as an analysis of the
role of fiscal incentives. It should also address infastructure, education, and workforce
development. Paramount is the recognition that economic development has to be part
of any statewide vision and that the state’s fiscal structure must be consistent with, and
support, economic development objectives.
Improve tax expenditure reporting. Giveaways of the tax base in the form of new
and ongoing exemptions and incentives that typically receive no formal budgetary
accounting are key contributors to state structural distress. Such giveaways include
services largely exempt from sales tax bases, discretionary incentives to promote
economic development, and preferences granted under personal and corporate income
taxes. Arizona does not provide any forward-looking estimates of tax expenditures nor
does it provide any narrative explaining why the expenditures were put in place.21 Data
on these costs would allow citizens and policymakers to observe the near-term and
long-term consequences of exemptions to state taxation—and ultimately help reduce
giveways and loopholes.
Educate citizens about the fiscal implications of referenda. Important as they are,
voter mandates can have unintended, or at least not well understood, budgetary
consequences, particularly when economic, demographic, and/or fiscal conditions shift
after the initiatives are approved. State governments should work with universities and
other groups to provide unbiased, readily accessible, and transparent information to
voters on how proposed referenda are likely to impact budgets in the short- and longerterm so that they can carefully weigh the benefits of new mandates against their fiscal
implications before making their decisions at the ballot-box.

VII. Conclusion
Arizona is at a critical point. The state has always relied on its next growth spurt to pull it
out of any downturn and keep the revenues flowing. This time is different. This time the
budgetary problems are deeply entrenched, the choices painful, and there is no quick
fix in sight.
In the end, inaction is not an option. Evasion and delay will only lengthen the present crisis
at a time when Arizona needs to renew the economic progress of the state and its residents.
Tomorrow’s innovative industries will not want to stay or locate in a state with dismal
K-12 funding and performance, a mediocre university system, and a devastated social
safety net. Therefore, making the hard choices necessary to bring into balance necessary
spending and adequate revenue raising stands as the necessary first work of launching
the state into its second century.
If Arizona is to position itself as a seedbed and hub for vibrant business, new economies,
and economic growth, a stable, predictable, and balanced budget is essential. And
to achieve that, leaders must accept the need to balance the need for discipline on
expenditures with the need for adequate revenues.
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